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The Tuition Dilemma and the Politics of 




The prospect of tuition fee increases for public sector 
universities has attracted an enormous amount of attention in 
recent years as governments in all industrialized countries have 
responded to the converging pressures of increased demands for 
higher educat ion and rising costs of compet ing areas of social 
spending. I show that this d i l emma is fast approaching a critical 
point in both Canada and the UK. As contemporary society become 
"knowledge societies," postsecondary systems become "complex ," 
requir ing a sensitive political b lending of different institutional 
goals, such as accessibility, diversity of mission, critical thought, 
relevance, and social usefulness . This article draws upon the policy 
model of income contingent repayment (ICR) as a touchstone for 
debates and larger proposals about addressing the fu ture of higher 
educat ion reform. M y hope is to show the partial shortcomings of 
the traditional alternatives: reliance on state-provided subsidy on the 
one hand and deregulated and flexible fees on the other. I then argue 
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that changes in the social and political meaning of participation in 
higher education might warrant taking a second look at the "smart 
funding" approach represented by ICR proposals. 
RÉSUMÉ 
La possibilité d'augmentation des frais de scolarité dans les 
universités du secteur public a attiré beaucoup d ' attention ces dernières 
années. Pendant ce temps, les gouvernements des pays industrialisés 
répondaient aux pressions convergentes suscitées par les demandes 
accrues d 'un enseignement plus élevé et par les coûts croissants de 
domaines économiquement concurrents. Cette étude montre que ce 
dilemme devient rapidement critique au Canada et au Royaume-Uni. 
Alors que la société contemporaine développe ses connaissances, 
les systèmes post-secondaires deviennent plus complexes, exigeant 
que l 'on sache ménager les sensibilités et prendre en considération 
de nombreux objectifs institutionnels tels que l 'accessibilité et la 
diversité de la mission. Cet article utilise le modèle du remboursement 
des revenus contingents (ICR) comme base d'argumentation pour 
traiter de la réforme de l 'enseignement supérieur. Tout d 'abord, 
j 'essaie de montrer les imperfections partielles des alternatives 
traditionnelles : les subventions gouvernementales d 'une part et de 
l 'autre, la dérégulation et la flexibilité des frais. Ensuite, je discute 
de l ' idée selon laquelle les changements politiques et sociaux sur le 
plan de l 'éducation supérieure pourraient justifier un second coup 
d'oeil sur les propositions du ICR (approche smart funding). 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, governments have begun to redesign tuition-
based financing systems for universities. Some (most recently 
Britain's Labour government) have introduced a method of what I 
call "smart" funding, whereby financing is increasingly drawn f rom 
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(or against) the future income of "beneficiaries" of the system, and 
less f rom current "users" of the system, or their parents. The putative 
goal is to ensure that assistance can be delivered in a targeted way, 
while preserving public insurance objectives such as accessibility 
and incentives to invest in "human capital." Most importantly, 
the adoption of the new student finance schemes are a response 
to concerns about how to cover the increased carrying costs of 
higher education due to increasing participation rates and greater 
competition f rom other areas of public spending. Because income-
contingent repayment (ICR) systems allow targeted benefits, while 
covering everyone, they have become an attractive policy model 
for postsecondary financing. A smart funding scheme can retain 
the most important and relevant qualities of a distinctly "public" 
postsecondary system. It does so, partially, because it redistributes 
scarce support more equitably and efficiently, providing somewhat 
less to those who can afford to fund themselves, either f rom parents 
or out of future earnings, and leaving more to be concentrated toward 
those who face the greatest hurdles and barriers. More importantly, 
however, it holds the prospect of creating a more constructive and 
explicit moral dialogue about the social contract underpinning the 
provision of a modern postsecondary education system. 
This article inquires more deeply into the "political" 
implications of the still-unresolved tuition dilemmas facing 
Canada's postsecondary sector. The approach is to survey recent 
economic and policy arguments and also the background for recent 
policy developments in both Canada and the U.K. It is argued that 
if smart funding frameworks evolve in Canada they will need to 
be developed and evaluated based on the possible interplay with 
other policy challenges related to weak provincial/federal policy 
coordination, the potentially dangerous impact of fee differentiation/ 
deregulation, and the shift toward a contributions-based social 
insurance model. Seeking a socially progressive solution, it shows 
how a more systematic analysis would help address some of the 
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shortcomings of the positions taken in recent years by both "tuition 
freeze" advocates, who normally oppose ICR, and economists, who 
sometimes support it for the wrong reasons. 
Costs, Quality, and Expansion in a "Mass" Higher Education System 
The tuition dilemma is intimately linked with the changing 
scale and structural shape of the modern higher education system. 
Canada, like all other industrially advanced countries, is at a pivotal 
stage of its transition f rom an "elite" to a "mass" system of higher 
education. However much we are inclined to think of this as a natural 
and attractive development, the strains and burdens of expanding 
postsecondary education are considerable. A compelling case can 
be made that the central problem of university funding policy in 
a "knowledge society" is how to respond to pressures for greater 
participation without making compromises in the areas of quality, 
accessibility, institutional mandates, and capacity. Even Germany, 
long known for its commitment to a free tuition policy, has begun to 
consider how it can maintain a universal and full student subsidy at 
a time when enrolment demands are outstripping population growth 
and ever-growing threats to the quality of university learning and 
research are becoming more obvious and serious. (Ziegele, 2001) 
In virtually all industrially advanced countries, postsecondary 
systems have reached unprecedented levels of participation 
increases at a time when higher education budgets face increasing 
competition with other public needs, such as health care and social 
security. Despite increased participation in Canada, public spending 
on postsecondary institutions has remained flat in real terms and 
has actually declined sharply as a share of both GDP and overall 
government spending (OECD, 2001). Over the past 22 years, the 
share of university operating budgets provided by government 
transfers has slipped 25% and per student funding has declined by 
approximately the same amount (AUCC, 2002). Many governments 
have been tempted to reduce per-student subsidies by either raising 
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fees or by switching f rom grants to loans (Barr, 2001; Davenport, 
2002). This has driven private educational spending in Canada 
f rom .7% of GDP to 1.3% (OECD, 2001). In Canada, this has led 
to concerns about declining quality as the national average student/ 
faculty ratio has been pushed up by around 25%. Over the mid to 
late 1990s, Canadian universities actually saw a levelling off of 
participation rates, accomplished in effect by making admissions 
policies more selective, which generally has an adverse effect on 
prospective students of less advantaged backgrounds (AUCC, 2002). 
Taken as a whole, these trends are problematic since they come 
at a time when social and economic institutions are increasingly 
reliant on broadening the base of knowledge, intelligent and active 
citizenship, as well as capacities for innovation. 
Declining government contributions cannot be absorbed 
by cutting institutional costs alone, and, as a result, average 
undergraduate tuition fees have nearly doubled f rom approximately 
$2000 in 1990-91 to almost $4000 in 2001-02 (Usher, 2002). Due to 
large increases in private contributions, overall spending on higher 
education has actually increased as a percentage of GDP since the 
mid 90s. In fact, on a per student basis, operating revenues have 
actually risen by 8%. However, this can be deceiving: actual per 
student expenditures on faculty and staff salaries has declined, and 
all of the increases in spending have been directed toward overhead 
and institutional student assistance to help offset higher tuition 
costs (Statistics Canada, 2003). Even if we leave "affordability" 
issues aside, it is debatable whether large tuition fee increases have 
adequately offset reduced transfers f rom government. In response 
to these fears, all levels of governments have created or expanded 
more targeted streams of funding. Some of these are expenditures 
and programs targeted at strategic innovation and research (AUCC, 
2002; Axelrod, 2002). Most of the remainder of the restored 
funding has come in the form of tuition-offsetting transfers to 
individuals, such as "Canada Millennium" scholarships, student 
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loans, education savings grants and tax credits for individuals and 
families. Many scholars and advocacy groups have complained that 
the new funds are regressive, providing little help to the neediest 
individuals, whose families are least able to save for university, or 
who gain fewer benefits f rom tax deductions (Bell & Anisef, 2002; 
Finnie, 2001). 
From 1986 to 1994, all socio-economic groups increased their 
rate of participation in university, but the "lower" groups fell 
further behind the "middle" and "high" groups, despite evidence of 
high demand in all groups (Usher, 2002). Tuition freeze advocates 
see a necessary connection between rising tuition or heavy student 
debt loads and neo-liberal policy preferences for reduced social 
expenditures, deregulation, and increased reliance on private user 
fees. They have been able to point to polls suggesting that students 
and their families are increasingly worried about the rising private 
costs of higher education, and they perceive these increases as 
actual or potential barriers to participation. Among their fears has 
been that the introduction of an ICR loan scheme might be one of 
the final nails in the coffin of strong public support for universities. 
This feeling has been supported by the fact that the original idea 
for an ICR scheme was devised by Milton Friedman as part of his 
plan to eliminate government funding for universities altogether 
(Friedman, 1955). Among federal parties in Canada, the ICR model 
has had the enthusiastic support of privatization-friendly parties on 
the right, such as the former Canadian Alliance. 
At the crest of neo-liberal reform in Canada, vibrant and 
effective protests organized by student groups in 1995 were 
successful in opposing policies that would have increased tuitions 
after introducing an ICR plan. Among the very few promises not 
kept by Ontario 's tax-cutting Progressive Conservative government 
in the late 1990s was the pledge to introduce an income-contingent 
loan system which would complement the introduction of higher 
tuition fees and greater flexibility to charge differentially higher 
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fees for selected programs, particularly in fields where graduates are 
well-remunerated. The Council of Ontario Universities supported 
ICR as part of an approach that would allow universities greater 
f reedom to raise fees and absorb cuts to government transfers. 
In the end, fees were selectively increased, partly to offset lost 
federal government transfers, and also partly to pay for reductions 
in provincial tax rates. 
The Contested Link between Tuition and Accessibility 
If common ground is to be found on the question of the future 
mix of public and private costs, one might expect that it would 
emerge in the context of policy deliberations about widening 
accessibility and expanded participation. Indeed the point is 
often made by governments that, because we live in a knowledge 
society, accessibility to higher education will have to be widened 
for the sake of accelerated social mobility, maintenance of a high-
wage economy, and the building of a more informed, inclusive 
and egalitarian society. Expansion of the system will obviously 
have to occur through recruitment of those groups traditionally 
most excluded. In its recent publication, Knowledge Matters, 
the federal government has, therefore, declared that "[a]ction is 
needed to address factors such as debt aversion, lack of information 
or the "sticker shock" effect of high and rising education costs 
that may discourage less advantaged Canadians f rom pursuing 
postsecondary education" (Human Resources Development 
Canada, 2002). However, on the issue of the stated goal of 
ensuring affordability, current government policy directions either 
lack clarity or are counterproductive. The possible approaches 
mentioned in the document were vague and included simplifying 
loan programs, holding discussions with the provinces around 
student assistance and using e-learning and lifetime learning to 
"manage the pressure of enrolment growth." In its 2004 budget, 
the new Liberal government of Paul Martin has continued the old 
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strategy of encouraging more long-term education savings (even by 
dangling increased savings incentives for low and middle income 
families, most of whom cannot save in advance of their child's 
participation) and raising student loan limits to cover increased 
tuition costs. In a gesture to the very poorest students, tuition grants 
of $3000 will be made available, but only in the first year. What 
is missing are increased transfers to the provinces for institutions. 
This approach signals to provincial governments that, if they wish 
to meet increasing demand and maintain quality, they can continue 
to raise tuition fees or deregulate them for selected programs. 
Perhaps it is too simplistic to say that the shortcomings of the 
federal government 's approach can be blamed solely on a failure of 
political will or its constitutionally limited authority in this area. In 
fact, there is another problem: the very task of understanding and 
clarifying how tuition fee levels relate to the goal of accessibility 
has proven controversial and complex (Lowe & Looker, 2001). For 
instance, Quebec has lower tuition levels than any other province, but 
also lower and more slowly growing participation rates than many. 
For their part, Ontario and Nova Scotia have higher average tuition 
levels, but also have among the highest and fastest growing rates of 
participation (Doherty-Delorme & Shaker, 1992). Presumably these 
counter-intuitive correlations exist because enrolment decisions are 
based on a number of factors, such as labour market conditions and 
social and cultural influences. 
There is little doubt that there is a very strong and stubbornly 
persistent correlation between low socio-economic status and low 
participation in higher education. In addition, there appears to be 
a similar relationship between parental postsecondary education 
and participation among all socio-economic groups, but especially 
the lower two quartiles (Knighton, 2002). The problem, therefore, 
demands serious attention. However, it is doubtful that solutions 
can be sought if one's sights are fixed solely on the relationship 
between fee levels and the choice to pursue higher education. This 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIV, No. 1, 2004 
The Tuition Dilemma 55 
is probably because socio-economic factors and the possession of 
social and cultural capital each have an impact on later postsecondary 
participation, long before students and their families are faced with 
tuition and borrowing costs (Heckman & Carneiro, 2002; Piatt 
& Robinson, 2001). In the U.K., students f rom different socio-
economic backgrounds with similar "A-level" scores have virtually 
the same rate of university attendance (Vignoles, 2003). In Canada, 
a study done for Alberta Learning highlighted the gap between the 
perceptions about the "affordability" barrier and the actual behaviour 
reflected in enrolment decisions. Price-sensitivity clearly dominates 
popular perceptions about affordability. Forty-four percent of non-
attendees in the survey group stated that the reason for their own 
non-enrolment was related to tuition fees. When all respondents were 
asked about their perceptions about access to university, the barrier 
posed by high fees was the most commonly cited reason (given by 
70% of participants). However, when enrolment behaviour itself 
was analyzed, the results showed that university enrolment rates 
by students f rom low and high income groups varied by only 3% 
among those who were academically eligible for admissions (Ipsos-
Reid, 2001). Therefore, social and economic inequality affects 
preparedness and the cultural dispositions for higher education— 
especially university—and not just the ability to pay the toll to enter 
the system. 
As government funding has decreased, it is not only rising 
student fees that have filled the gap, but also rising student debt, 
which in 2000 was 76% higher than it was a decade before (Allen 
& Vaillancourt, 2004). It is, therefore, important to consider what 
the impact of rising debt has been. According to economist Ross 
Finnie, the concern over dramatically rising student debt burdens 
is warranted, but he also warns that many aspects of the student 
debt problem tend to misrepresent the problem of affordability 
and accessibility. Finnie and other economists argue that although 
students are covering the increasing private costs of higher education 
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by borrowing, they are doing so at a time when the private returns 
to postsecondary education are more attractive than ever (Finnie, 
2001; D.A.A. Stager, 1996). Moreover, although students and their 
families may be squeezed at the specific life-phase when they 
must pay tuition, governments have begun to respond with more 
responsively-designed and flexible loan systems which promise 
to offer a self-correcting mechanism that provides both equity and 
efficiency. In particular, governments responsible for implementing 
the Canada Student Loan Program have begun to offset the rising 
threat of increased loan defaults, by adopting ex post income-
contingency, that is, by introducing debt relief and forgiveness for 
those facing demonstrable hardship after graduation (Finnie, 2001). 
Some have therefore argued that Canada needs a more systematic 
and formal ICR plan. Australia was among the first countries to 
introduce a "smart" funding scheme in which fees were introduced 
rapidly in the late 1980s, but tuition payments were deferred— 
and made income-contingent—by an ICR plan. The data shows 
Australia—which up until recently subsidized approximately 63% 
of the cost of higher education, despite the prevalence of neo-liberal 
policies since 1996—has been able to increase participation rates 
despite higher fees, although the participation gap between lower 
and higher socio-economic groups is quite similar to that of Canada 
(Chapman & Ryan, 2002). 
It is hard to conclusively demonstrate what impact existing 
ICR programs have had on easing the burden of higher fees, since 
one can' t know how outcomes would have varied under different 
policies, labour market conditions, etc. It can be speculated that ICR 
programs might turn out to be the best available political mechanism 
for expanding postsecondary enrolments. If they are to be successful 
in increasing participation by less advantaged groups, they should 
be coupled with the use of grants for the poorest and most debt-
averse students. Just as importantly, they should be blended with 
other policies that bring in the funding necessary to meet expansion 
The Canadian Journal of Higher Education 
Volume XXXIV, No. 1, 2004 
The Tuition Dilemma 57 
and alleviate the deeper social inequalities that matter most. 
Otherwise, socio-economic exclusion could occur through less 
visible mechanisms that have nothing to do with tuition, such as 
selective admission, reductions in funded enrolments, and poor 
funding of primary and secondary education.1 
The Normative Debate about Price Subsidies: Public or Private Good? 
The prospect of "smart" funding of higher education, therefore, 
points to the need to examine and clarify the connection between 
normative and economic questions. The faith in markets and the 
expectation of high private returns guide the traditional thinking 
of many economists who favour private contributions over low 
tuition. However, many of these same economists have had to 
recognize the rationale for price subsidies in higher education. 
The traditional arguments for highly subsidized fees are well-
known. Higher education produces a large amount of "social 
returns." These include not only human capital assets and skills 
f rom which all of society benefits, but also less tangible benefits, 
such as an atmosphere of critical inquiry, an appreciation of the 
value of learning, tolerance, and civic participation, and so on. In 
a similar vein, investments in higher education lead to "positive 
externalities," which are unpriced benefits captured by those 
other than the buyer or seller of higher education. This weakens 
the incentives for economically rational agents/consumers to 
invest in the socially optimal amount of postsecondary education 
unless third party subsidies are made available. Another problem 
of "market failure" is connected to the unavoidable characteristics 
of investments in human capital, as distinct f rom other forms of 
capital. Many people who, by participating in higher education, 
would create private benefits for themselves and spill-over benefits 
for society, will not be able to borrow the money to invest in human 
capital. This is because human capital is not the kind of alienable 
asset that can be offered as collateral to prospective lenders. Finally, 
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because higher education is an "experience" good, its value is hard 
to determine before it is "consumed," even by rational economic 
agents. (Winston, 1999). In order to produce the "right amount" of 
higher education, we therefore need significantly subsidized tuition 
or loans and a large government role for supporting and rewarding 
the choice to pursue it. 
State subsidies are justified by considerations that lie outside 
of incentive problems in economic theory. Normative, critical, and 
institutional arguments suggest that distance f rom the market is 
necessary to sustain the internal goods and integrity of the higher 
education enterprise. According to these perspectives, the advance of 
knowledge itself—perhaps especially in areas of basic research and 
general education—can only occur in an environment where there 
is separation f rom the pressures of the market and protection against 
commercialism. Society benefits f rom higher education precisely 
because the process and experience of questioning and discovery 
remains open, critical and curious in a way that is not supported 
by the market and utilitarian frameworks. In the end, governments 
have a difficult responsibility that they would be wrong to offload 
into the marketplace. It is true that as postsecondary institutions 
become broader and more expansive, they are inevitably evaluated 
increasingly in diverse terms, including that of marketability. The 
problem is that this reinforces the image of universities serving 
consumers or "publics" with pre-given wants and needs, or 
identifiable "utility functions." If this image is taken too far, one 
runs the risk of undermining the very function of advanced learning 
and reflection, which is often to change and/or challenge the person 
or society whose interests are being served. Indeed, it is arguable 
that one of the best qualities of universities is that they can play a 
crucial role in prompting social actors to reflect on how the utilitarian 
and non-utilitarian values of their culture might be appropriately 
blended or distinguished.2 Activities involving higher knowledge 
and learning, therefore, involve a complex mix of incommensurable 
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goods, which is why we expect them to be responsive to markets 
and independent of them at the same time. 
In some respects, however, the very complexity of the university-
society relationships can make it easier for traditional economic 
scepticism toward price subsidies to gain traction, especially as 
cash strapped governments and public universities look to solve 
the funding challenges of an expanding system. Although most 
economists in reality believe that some level of subsidy is necessary 
because of spillovers, they worry that the political process can drive 
the level of subsidy too high and that unwarranted antipathy toward 
the market can lead to unrealistic, self-serving or dysfunctional 
policies. A sampling of their arguments follows: 
1. Even if the social and civic returns to higher education 
rival the importance of the "private" returns, the latter are 
increasing in importance given the role of knowledge and 
innovation in today's society. Relying on social returns or 
"spillovers" to justify higher support for universities may 
have a moral and ideological appeal, but it assumes a level of 
good will and farsightedness that is rare among policymakers. 
The expectation of private returns by individuals is a more 
tangible and powerful lever for motivating support and 
participation, and therefore provides a more sustainable 
incentive system for increased investment (Laidler, 2002; 
D.A.A. Stager, 1996). 
2. The claim that universities need full independence from 
the market is self-serving, at best, and socially wasteful, at 
worst. The best way to get universities to be responsible is 
to expose them to the discipline of the market where their 
services would have to be priced. Students would become 
more alert consumers than the state has been up until now; 
they will make a greater effort to assess the real value of the 
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services offered, choose more relevant disciplines, complete 
their degrees more quickly, etc. In recent years governments 
have not recognized the autonomy of universities and 
colleges, and have become more managerial in their demands 
upon them. Seeking "value for money" f rom a subsidized 
sector, they have imposed performance contracts that may 
not adequately reflect the appropriate missions and priorities 
for each institution. A far better approach than adding 
another layer of inefficient state regulation would be to make 
universities more accountable for their performance in the 
market. Reliance on tuition revenue will make universities 
more responsive—and perhaps even more independent— 
than will performance contracts which encourage distortions 
associated with rigid compliance, political expediency, and 
ad hoc bargaining (Barr, 2001; Davenport, 2002). 
3. Subsidies in higher education are leaky. Provinces in Canada 
are wary of supporting students who, because of their high 
level of skills, become mobile and frequently migrate to 
"free-riding" jurisdictions. Public support is inevitably too 
low because of this fear of free riding. Hard-nosed realism 
dictates that funding will only be adequate when people pay 
fees that are closer to the full cost or value of the education 
they receive. 
4. Canadian (or British, etc.) postsecondary institutions need 
to become more competitive with their elite American 
counterparts. The ability to charge whatever fees the market 
will bear will bring in the funds necessary to hire the best 
faculty, bring in the best private sector partnerships, win the 
confidence of governments, etc. 
From this survey of economic opinion, we can see some of the 
attractions for policymakers to lean toward market competition 
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over the state as a governance and resource allocating mechanism. 
However, it is important to see that, in many respects, the very 
alternative between subsidy and market competition is misleading. 
Even the American private university sector is largely subsidy-
based; although the source of those subsidies is typically found in 
"donative wealth" (largely f rom alumni contributions), which is re-
circulated as financial aid, and increasingly merit aid. The dynamic 
of competition and private financing in the American system has led 
to higher-than-inflationary tuition increases, almost half of which 
are redistributed back into financial aid schemes. As Winston has 
argued, this has led to skewed hierarchies where the price paid has 
little relation to the value of the "product": 
The average student subsidy in U.S. higher education is 
an impressive $8,200 a year. The student pays $3,800 for 
$12,000 in education.. .The average school in the top decile 
gives each student a subsidy of nearly $22,800 a year f rom 
donative resources—to support a $28,500 education—while 
the average school at the bottom gives each student a $1,800 
subsidy to help pay for a $7,900 education. One result is that 
the student at the bottom actually pays a higher net price 
than the student at the top (Winston, 1999). 
Following influential arguments by Winston (1999) as well as 
Frank and Cook (1995), the American system of market-oriented 
high tuitions (in the elite private sector especially) is both fictional 
and far f rom ideal; it has led to winner-take-all markets and 
wasteful spending on competition for merely positional advantages 
that don ' t improve overall quality and social equity in the system. 
The over-emphasis on merit-based aid becomes a survival strategy 
in winner-take-all competition, where universities are forced to 
channel too many resources into competition for "customer inputs" 
and "peer quality." It, therefore, effectively inflates the elitism 
and prestige hierarchy of the system, while producing little return 
(Dynarski, 2002). 
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The underlying reality of the putative market model in the United 
States system of higher education involves some largely unexamined 
moral and political choices about how to subsidize. The best way to 
approach the reality of the Canadian situation is to see that it is faced 
with similarly unexamined moral and political choices about how 
to configure "assistance"—or redistribution—around the various 
options between loan relief and taxpayer subsidy. 
ICR and the Struggle against Marketization 
ICR plans are part of what can be called a "smart funding" 
approach to postsecondary reform. They involve deferred and 
contingent payment of fees on the basis of a loan scheme that 
specifies income thresholds for repayment—usually through the 
tax system—after graduation. Some observers argue that what 
makes the ICR approach "smart" is that it opens the door for an 
increasingly market-based orientation. However, most countries 
that have adopted ICR have not tried to deregulate fees. Nor have 
they cut total public funding over the long term, but, instead, have 
used it to finance expansion. Recent announcements by fiscally 
conservative governments in the U.K. and Australia have promised 
to supplement ICR-covered tuition increases with government 
transfers in order to expand the system. In reality, then, what makes 
this approach "smart" is that it avoids the binary choice of whether 
the state or the "user" should pay. Instead, contributions are scaled 
to the life-cycle of students on the grounds that current "users" are 
also potential "beneficiaries." Since higher education is the type 
of good for which "ability to pay" and the experience of benefits 
cannot be known up front, it is both fairer and more efficient to 
scale payment obligations to income after graduation. ICR means 
that the system is "beneficiary-financed" rather than "user-financed" 
(or "parent-financed") in a way that is not possible with either of 
the traditional "state" or "market" models. The exact repayment 
formulas and mechanisms are subject to significant variation, and 
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they can be either well or poorly designed f rom both a technical and 
a normative perspective. Typically, those who don' t earn above the 
threshold do not pay, and a sunset clause may stipulate that the loan 
is forgiven after a certain number of years. In addition, interest rates 
may be more or less subsidized, or no interest may be charged and 
the value of the loan principal may be simply increased by inflation 
until it is paid off or forgiven. The scope of insured borrowing can 
vary in breadth—in Australia, ICR loans do not cover living costs, 
while in the U.K. they do (up to a maximum of approximately $9,000 
per year). 
One of the central reasons ICR proposals can be both intriguing 
and vexing is that they apply to the provision of a non-compulsory 
public service quite unlike universal medicare or primary and 
secondary schooling (Goodman & Kaplan, 2003). The pool of 
students participating in higher education—or at least university 
education—is distinctive: compared to non-participants, they are 
far more likely to come from wealthier families and far more likely 
to have higher incomes after graduation. In addition, postsecondary 
education possesses many counter-intuitive qualities for a public 
good: it is distributed in a way that on the whole rewards merit, not 
just by the awarding of scholarships, but also by granting unequal 
admission to more selective, and more recognized institutions. From 
this perspective, universal subsidies in higher education are a morally 
questionable instrument of public policy, in that they involve a net 
transfer of resources from less well-off to more well-off students, 
leaving too few resources to support quality improvements and to 
enhance participation opportunities by people f rom disadvantaged 
backgrounds. ICR-covered tuition is justified to the extent that it 
makes available a more targeted and effective form of subsidy. 
Some people have argued that collecting more money f rom the 
progressive income tax system is a fairer and more efficient source 
of funding, especially since postsecondary graduates earn more 
and therefore pay proportionately more as they move into higher 
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marginal tax brackets (Allen, 1998; Barr, 2001). The reliance on 
a tax-financed subsidy also appears to have a strategic advantage: 
providing a standard subsidy for each enrolment maintains a kind of 
"benefits universality," which strengthens the willingness of more 
advantaged groups to support a strong public system. However, it 
is questionable whether, in practice, this model always achieves the 
right balance between equity and efficiency. Even fully subsidized 
fees cover only part of the cost, leaving less advantaged students 
exposed to especially high barriers to participation because of the 
need to borrow or work to pay living costs. The universality of the 
subsidy treats all students as equally in need of assistance only when 
it comes to paying educational costs, but in doing so, it leaves fewer 
scarce public resources to help the most needy in other ways, and 
it does little to encourage participation f rom groups who would 
participate without these public resources. A system that leaves 
little room for targeted means-tested assistance, or expansion to 
meet rising demands and aspirations, would be self-defeating f rom 
a social justice and equity standpoint. 
There are other arguments against the introduction of an income-
contingent loan system. The ICR approach has been introduced to 
manage the introduction of increased tuitions and even variable 
fees, and, as a consequence, it might encourage the view that higher 
education is a consumer good or commodity. This would lead to 
declining overall support for public postsecondary institutions, and 
could become one of the driving wedges toward "privatization" 
favoured by neo-liberals. There would be less reason to regard higher 
education as a public good or to ensure that universities—however 
relevant and socially engaged we want them to be—must have their 
independence f rom the market protected. In fact, some economists 
actually oppose ICR plans on the grounds that they create a moral 
hazard. Like any other insurance plan that is intended to protect 
against adverse events or financial shortfalls, ICR can give an 
incentive for people to be irresponsible or insufficiently self-reliant. 
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Rather than worrying about getting a good job to pay down one's 
student loans, some people will decide to be malingerers. Even more 
alarming to these economists, some students might decide that the 
process of learning, critical inquiry, and discovery might have its 
own rewards and not merely a utilitarian benefit in the labour market 
(Smith, 2002). 
Contrary to fears about losing protection f rom the market, in 
today's context, over-reliance on transfers and subsidies may be more 
likely to reinforce market values or misplaced entrepreneurialism 
than a contributory social insurance regime (Johnstone, 2000). 
In Canada, political constraints against raising fees on uninsured 
students has lead to a model of bargaining for university support 
that, in effect, has enlarged the emphasis on market-oriented 
development. The behaviour of university administrators and 
lobbyists becomes shaped by the threat of funding cuts and the 
concomitant need to negotiate for those "pieces of the action" 
that are independent of core funding (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). 
Universities are then too easily tempted to become either cost-
cutters or shortsighted supplicants for industry-sponsored projects 
and corporate clients. In some provinces, like Ontario, high-
prestige areas like business and professional programs have won 
exemptions f rom fee regulation altogether. This is in sharp contrast 
to the moderately graduated, but nationally regulated, fee schedules 
in countries that have ICR schemes. 
In Ontario, there is a strongly warranted fear that professional 
schools are becoming elitist enclaves promising high financial 
rewards for students f rom well-heeled families or for highly indebted 
graduates who need to strike it rich after they earn their credentials. 
Quirke and Davies (2002) mention a number of distortions that may 
result f rom this, such as the polarizing split between affordable 
and elite niches, as well as erosion of the tradition of maintaining a 
community of equals among institutions in the larger postsecondary 
system. Many areasof education thatprepare graduates andresearchers 
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for disinterested and forward-looking service to society are strained 
in favour of a market-oriented model. This leads to a "defection 
of the rich" and a consequent self-reinforcing ghettoization of the 
subsidized or less marketable sectors. Arguably, this has affected 
many basic arts and sciences areas where faculty become divided 
among higher-tier researchers and lower-tier, lower-paid teaching-
only staff who have irregular careers teaching large impersonal 
classes. In this context, it is widely accepted that students tend to 
adapt to larger classes by adopting an increasingly instrumentalist 
and narrow consumerist attitude toward their courses, degrees, and 
grades (Buchbinder & Rajagopal, 1993). Finally, inflexible reliance 
on annual state budgeting has possibly increased "corporatization." 
Areas ripe for commercialization and "technology transfer" now 
receive much of the attention f rom policy-makers concerned with 
university research. Such arrangements enable governments to keep 
basic operating grants low by promising to selectively fund those 
areas that are either "open for business" or which have short-term 
market needs. For all these reasons, a world of low tuition fees may 
not only offer a false promise of better accessibility; it may also 
offer little guarantee against the vices of excessive commercialism, 
privatization, and marketization. 
"Smart" Funding: Not in Canada, But in the U.K. 
One of the likely factors contributing to the problematic shape 
of Canada's response to the postsecondary funding squeeze is 
the notoriously weak and disjointed pattern of provincial-federal 
coordination, which is widely blamed on the country's strategically 
cumbersome constitutional assignment of jurisdiction (D. Stager, 
1996). The federal government shares jurisdiction with the provinces 
over some sources of student assistance, and it administers most of 
the key programs having to do with sponsored, targeted, and direct 
research funding. Unwilling to specify how much of the Canada 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST) is ultimately transferred by the 
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provinces to higher education institutions, Ottawa has concentrated 
a disproportionate amount of new student assistance money toward 
socially regressive tax relief and postsecondary savings grants. One 
would also assume that if an ambitious financing policy, like ICR 
loans, was initiated, the loan amounts set for tuition deferral would 
mean increased federal influence over tuition policy currently firmly 
in the hands of the provinces. Although this change might offer 
welcome relief f rom the funding uncertainty built into the CHST, 
political opposition remains strong. 
Matters are different in the U.K., not because student fees are 
popular, but because authority over higher education policy resides 
at the national level. Indeed, as this article is being written, vast 
structural reforms are being finalized amidst stormy debates. The 
underlying structural challenges and dilemmas in the U.K. bear 
some significant similarities to those in Canada. Higher education 
has expanded rapidly in the U.K. to the point where participation 
rates are now approximately 43%, but per student public funding 
has declined 36% since the early 1980s (DfES, 2003; Greenaway & 
Haynes, 2000). Until 1998, students paid no fees and some students 
had access to means-tested maintenance grants. In the 1990s, the 
government partially replaced grants with loans, and the structure of 
the loans were conventional (non-contingent payback provisions), 
with interest deferred until after graduation. In 1998, Blair 's New 
Labour government enacted a number of reforms recommended 
in the "Dearing Commission" report. It eliminated "maintenance" 
grants, introduced means-tested fees of CA$2300 (covering 
approximately 25% of operating costs), and re-structured loans so 
that they were income-contingent and were paid back—through the 
income tax system—at a rate of 9% on income above $23,000. The 
1998 reforms also tied eligibility of loans to parental income. The 
reforms did little to solve the funding problems in the British system 
and did much to reinforce the growing perception that "New Labour" 
was simply another neo-liberal government in disguise. Despite the 
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partial introduction of fees, per student funding remained more than 
one-third below the levels of 1989-90, funding for research and 
teaching remained stretched and participation rates among students 
f rom socially disadvantaged backgrounds fell further behind those 
of other groups (Barr, 2001). 
In short, the problem with the 1998 reforms was that all of the 
funds made available by grant reductions and the re-introduction of 
fees went to meet the cost of increased demand, but none could be 
freed up for quality improvement or widening access (Callender, 
2002). In early 2003, after two years of consultation and acrimonious 
debate within and outside the New Labour caucus, the government 
finally issued its so-called "White Paper" outlining plans for a more 
adequate and ambitious reform (DfES, 2003). 
Although these reforms (covering England only) require final 
passage in the House of Lords, the three major pillars are likely to 
stand: regulated (capped) yet variable fees, a vastly expanded income 
contingent loan system, and non-repayable grants for poorer students. 
Although "base" fees will be set at $2500, institutions will be free to 
vary these fees to a maximum of $6900. It is expected that all of the 
elite "Russell Group" universities will charge the maximum for most 
or all programs, and surveys indicate that many of the universities 
across the system plan to follow suit. However, universities charging 
the full "variable" fees must sign an agreement with a newly 
constituted "Access Regulator" who would set targets for recruitment 
of non-traditional and disadvantaged students. Most importantly, no 
student will have to pay fees up-front, and loans will be available 
for all students independent of means-tested "parental contribution" 
requirements. Income-contingent loans—to cover as much as $9000 
in living costs—will also be made available to virtually all students, 
again, with very little or no family means testing. No interest will 
be charged for the loans—ensuring that those who pay back more 
slowly will not incur greater costs—but they will be indexed to 
inflation. In addition, the threshold for repayment of loans will be 
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raised f rom $23,000 to $34,300 so that graduates are insured against 
having to pay educational costs until it is affordable (again, at 9% 
of income above the threshold), and after 25 years the remaining 
liability is completely forgiven. The higher fees and the prospects 
of larger debts will be offset by grants aimed at students from low to 
middle income families. The family income threshold for receiving 
some of these targeted grants is near $70,000, and about one-third of 
all students will receive grants—some as high as $5500 per year—to 
offset both fees and living costs. The government has promised to 
increase public funding by 6% to ensure that new funding from fees 
does not displace government contributions or require a trade-off of 
greater participation for lower quality (DfES, 2003). 
The final shape of the package was determined by ten months of 
student lobbying and caucus revolts within a Labour party already 
seriously divided by Tony Blair 's support for the U.S.-led war in 
Iraq. Universities welcomed the new sources of revenue, although 
they worried about increased government meddling and "access 
regulation." Lecturers worried that variable fees would lead to the 
"marketization" of higher education and tiering between disciplines 
and institutions. The Conservative Party opportunistically reversed 
its "higher fees" platform from the previous election and proposed 
that fees should be eliminated altogether. Initially, the National 
Union of Students (NUS) publicly embraced the Conservative 
tactic of "isolating" New Labour on the fee question, while arguing 
that increased "welfare state" financing through the tax base could 
achieve the goals of low fees and an improved and expanded system 
(Curtis, 2003a, 2003b). Eventually the NUS orchestrated a vocal 
campaign of protests that failed to convince the government to alter 
its imposition of higher fees, but helped to win larger grants with 
more generous eligibility criteria. Only a last minute compromise 
allowed the bill to pass by a five-vote margin in the House of 
Commons, and, as of this writing, there is still pressure on the House 
of Lords to seek changes. 
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Reflections on Risk, Social Insurance, and Postsecondary Finance 
The recent political upheaval in the U.K. clearly illustrates the 
dilemmas of tuition policy and the challenge of building political 
support for "smart funding" alternatives, even where efforts are 
made to tilt many elements of the policy in a socially progressive 
direction. Part of the problem is that "smart" funding creates a more 
fluid and pluralistic platform for groups with contending ideological 
and theoretical commitments to compete in the same policy space 
(Johnstone, 2001). This represents much more of an opportunity 
than a drawback, especially in the challenging and awkward arena 
of postsecondary funding policy. 
It is notable that the policy initiatives in Britain have been 
proposed by Tony Blair who has adopted many of the "Third Way" 
reforms to the welfare state elaborated by sociologist Anthony 
Giddens. Together with Ulrich Beck, Giddens has developed 
the idea of the "risk society" or "reflexive society." (Beck, 1992; 
Giddens, 1994). In a risk society, there will be a move away f rom 
direct regulation and transfers, but not because of an ideological or 
pre-emptive fondness for the market. Rather the transition occurs 
because more of our social and individual fates, and therefore, 
more of our capacity to manage risk, deals with open-ended and 
indeterminate processes which are by their very nature harder to 
regulate ex ante or harder to cover by direct social provision. We 
live in an age of personalization and individualization which is, in 
large part, premised on the growing importance of knowledge for 
most life-contexts. This growing reflexivity means that the state 
cannot fully control whether higher education becomes a public or 
a private good for either its users or its beneficiaries; but the state 
can take steps to ensure that opportunities to pursue knowledge and 
learning are as socially inclusive as possible. 
The idea of ICR appeals most to those who see the welfare state 
as a system of insurance that manages risk and uncertainty. One of 
the features of a risk or reflexive society is that collective action and 
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solutions must be adapted to fit with increasingly individualized and 
self-organizing behaviours. Unlike the more vertical schemes for 
sharing risk characteristic of the traditional welfare state, our current 
society is one in which people are expected to participate actively 
in the measures by which opportunities and knowledge is managed 
relative to their life-process. This alters the moral expectations and 
claims we can make about the social contract underlying social 
insurance (Forss, Kalimo, & Purola, 2000; Stone, 2002). We are 
expected to be more aware of the role of opportunity and individual 
mobility in our lives and, as a result, more of our entitlements and 
interests must be seen against the background of our capacity to 
become self-active and self-creative. We still need a system where 
people can be protected against unforeseeable economic shocks and 
disadvantaged backgrounds, but this takes place under conditions in 
which we are learning how to equip ourselves for an "open future" 
(Giddens, 1998). In this context, the socially progressive state 
doesn't simply guarantee minimum benefits for those who passively 
receive them, but neither does it stand aside and declare itself an 
impartial referee in market competition stacked in favour of those 
with greater resources. In more cases public goods provision means 
helping people manage risk and self-development in the ambiguous 
and variable forms it takes. 
An ICR policy is one that fits with the politically ambiguous, but 
morally promising, idea of a "responsive" state that tries to "scratch 
where it itches." Any model that places limits on the categorical 
responsibility of the state for security and public goods provision 
can run the risk of strengthening neo-liberal policies. In the context 
of access to higher education, however, the goal should be to devise 
a student financing model that carefully incorporates the right 
combination of the different forms of social insurance, including 
contributory risk pooling, universal benefits, and means-testing. One 
of the problems of a contributory insurance scheme is that it may be 
managed in the manner of a private insurance plan which follows 
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an "actuarial" definition of the relationship between contributions 
and benefits (Forss et al., 2000). Commercial insurance schemes are 
preoccupied with erecting safeguards against moral hazards, defined 
as so-called "opportunistic" use of available pooled resources. 
However, too much actuarialism can breed a performance culture 
(Power, 1997), skewing higher education priorities in undesirable 
directions by requiring supported institutions and individuals to 
meet rigid performance objectives. For example, there might be too 
much emphasis on rewarding research institutions that can "spin 
o f f ' lucrative pharmaceutical patents at the expense of broader 
public and community health. Or an actuarially minded government 
might worry that, if it adopts ICR, it will never be paid back by 
under-performing graduates, and it might try to tie each institution's 
funding to its record of producing high-paying graduates, missing 
out on how well that university produces "transformation" for its 
students (Lomas, 2002). As a result, an approach that was too actuarial 
would be dismissive of the tentative and exploratory aspects of the 
mission of higher education. In social terms it might fail to reward 
institutions that sought to include socially disadvantaged groups 
into its mission. In intellectual terms, it might under-appreciate 
some forms of creativity, innovation, and critical approaches. A 
well-designed (truly "smart"!) contributions-based model for higher 
education would link contributions and benefits, but in a way that 
does not assume that all costs, risks, and benefits should be somehow 
perfectly priced. 
Similar issues arise in connection with the goals of "universality" 
and "means-testing." When it comes to determining responsibility for 
paying the costs of higher education, strict universality of benefits can 
be "too expensive," not in the neo-liberal sense of getting poor value 
for money, but in the social justice sense of being poorly targeted 
at the greatest needs. And means-testing must also be carefully 
developed; one needs to worry not only about "stigmatizing" the 
needy, but also about identifying "means" in a clumsy or static way 
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that is inappropriate for the choice to pursue higher education. This 
is why supporters of ICR argue that it is both distorting and socially 
paternalistic to force students to meet a parental means test to qualify 
for an income-contingent student loan (Barr, 2001; Finnie, 2001). 
Indeed, recent studies suggest that the current Canada Student 
Loans program often disqualifies applicants because of unrealistic 
expectations of parental support (Hemmingway, 2004). 
A well-designed smart funding model would include the 
appropriate mix of social insurance mechanisms and objectives. It 
would be partially contributory to the extent that recognizing the 
relationship between benefits and contributions does seem to be 
well suited to the individualized, "self-investment" qualities of the 
process of acquiring and developing post-compulsory skills and 
education. But it would also be partially universal in the sense that 
anyone who is enrolled in post secondary education is entitled to 
the protection of the plan. Finally, it would include means testing, 
but only in a "proportionate" way, that is, by scaling repayment 
obligations to eventual income and by supplying grants to those who 
might be deterred even by the more forgiving approach of deferring 
and insuring higher education costs. 
The adoption of an ICR program could have tremendous benefits 
in breaking the logjam related to federal/provincial conflicts. 
Today's neo-liberal funding policies, as well as the excessive push 
to "marketize" higher education, is at least partially a product of the 
institutional framework in which new funds must be negotiated in a 
distrustful turf battle between transfer payers and transfer recipients 
seeking short-run accountability and bargaining advantages f rom 
one another. If some of the new funding were to come from the later 
earnings of an insured, less fearful "user," a new source of trust might 
be introduced into a system in which the partially conflicting goals 
of accountability, autonomy, and accessibility find themselves in 
delicate balance.3 Overall tax-financed contributions might even be 
increased in an environment that was less polluted by the acrimony 
and shortsightedness of federal/provincial turf battles. 
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CONCLUSION 
The federal government of Canada should give renewed 
consideration to ICR loans as a platform for creating sustainable and 
equitable expansion of Canada's public postsecondary education 
system. Such a system is justified, in part, as a response to the 
implicit "fiscal politics" that constrains quality and expansion in 
higher education in favour of tuition subsidies. While public 
transfers should remain at the core of higher education funding, 
wider accessibility requires more targeted subsidies, particularly in a 
country like Canada that already devotes a greater share of its overall 
public expenditure to postsecondary education than any of its OECD 
counterparts (OECD, 2003). ICR offers a promising conceptual and 
moral envelope for bringing together agreed-upon principles for 
sharing the costs and risks of mass postsecondary education. Most 
Canadians strongly believe that higher education should be socially 
inclusive and affordable, and that the private burden of paying for it 
should be absorbed by student loans that are easily accessed (Ipsos-
Reid, 2004). Because today's postsecondary students comprise a large 
cohort of borrowers of unequal social backgrounds, this principle can 
best be implemented by universally insuring their education against 
later inability to pay, and by offering generous "up-front" grants for 
those from poorer backgrounds. 
It is equally important to remember that every approach to 
financing higher education can be said to exist in a complex interplay 
with other social and political interests that are likely to make 
themselves felt in the newly created policy space. Several notes of 
caution are therefore worth mentioning: 
1. Governments may opportunistically respond to the new 
credit driven funding model. If tuition charges rise, it is 
important that the new money supplements, rather than 
replaces, public support that comes in the form of block 
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grants and formula funding. As the recent examples of 
Britain and Australia show, the advantage of smart funding 
approaches will be lost if they do not translate into quality 
improvements and increased accessibility and responsiveness 
to unmet demand. In addition, more reliance on student—or 
graduate—contributions should not cause governments 
to over-react by vastly increasing their powers of review 
and supervision in the guise of "protecting" the value of 
students' investments. As higher education expands, the task 
of demonstrating the value and quality of its activities will 
have to become more attuned to broader social influences 
and standards. Narrow "value for money" accountability 
schemes can lead to internal divisions and distrust as well 
as short-sighted compliance-oriented practices that become 
self-defeating (Barnett, 2003). 
2. The attractions of fee deregulation should be resisted. In 
recent years, provincial governments in Ontario, Alberta, 
and British Columbia have moved to partially or totally 
deregulate fees. Sharply differentiated fees lead to tiering, 
which is not only socially inequitable, but also rests on 
the myth that flexible pricing reflects the "true" costs or 
marketable benefits of academic programs and courses. In 
reality, academic pricing can also play a role in influencing 
and distorting the social and economic priorities it is intended 
to reflect. Career paths, research interests, and models of 
professional service can be driven by the price of credentials. 
In addition, the problem of elite defections and "split-offs" 
f rom publicly supported sectors can obscure the value of 
cross-disciplinary collegiality, as well as cross-subsidies 
among disciplines within and among institutions. Adoption 
of ICR-driven funding arrangements should, therefore, be 
accompanied by standardized tuition bands, like those which 
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still prevail in nearly all Canadian provinces. Although there 
could be some limited variability for discipline and level— 
along the lines of recent reforms announced in Australia and 
the U.K.—great caution should be exercised in allowing 
fees to vary among same-category institutions. Resistance to 
outright deregulation is necessary to maintain one of the great 
strengths of Canada's public university system, namely, its 
capacity to support a sustainable middle ground in a context 
of regional and institutional diversity. 
3. Smart funding should be used as an opportunity to 
transform the defence of public higher education, rather 
than ease the transition toward privatization. Smart 
funding schemes are met with scepticism by traditional 
advocates of publicly funded higher education who rightly 
fear the increasing privatization of higher education or 
defeatism in the struggle to expand public funding. From a 
strategic point of view, advocates of low tuition have helped 
to thwart neo-liberal policy ideas that might otherwise have 
led to the withdrawal of adequate public funding. However, 
their approach is likely to become unsustainable in the 
face of further expansion (and institutional differentiation) 
that will mark the next phase of the "knowledge society." 
Reports submitted to governments in the U.K. and Australia 
have already given strong consideration to higher education 
vouchers and credits which could be spent at fully private 
institutions of varying quality and cost (Dealing, 1997; 
West, 1998). This would lead to far greater inequities, status 
competition, and fragmentation and could ultimately be 
ruinous for the kinds of equity goals that will be highlighted in 
a world of expanded higher education. Far f rom contributing 
to the privatization of higher education, smart funding— 
rather than education credits—may be the best chance to 
contain its spread. ^ 
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Notes 
1 This point has been captured nicely by Peter Scott (2003): "It is true 
that the well-off have benefited disproportionately f rom the expansion of 
universities. We now have a mass system of higher education for the middle 
classes, into which the brighter (and luckier) members of the working 
class are co-opted. But this outcome is inevitable so long as wealth and 
opportunities are so unequally distributed. It happens everywhere. Social 
inequality is at the root of higher education's "failure" to recruit a better 
social mix of students, not the elitism of universities which, however 
discreditable, is a side-show. Fair admissions cannot compensate for an 
unfair society." 
2 A generally similar argument—made with greater depth and differ-
ent emphases—can be found in Axelrod (2002) and Barnett (2003). 
3 David Robertson (2000, p. 92) offers the fol lowing scenario 
explaining the possible institutional consequences of students becom-
ing more independent stakeholders in the realm of higher education: 
"[Students ' ] behaviour will increasingly recognise that intellectual 
capital is a personal property to be developed in terms which reflect 
their own preferences and life-career points. Its development need not 
fit conveniently into the organizational and professional values of the 
university. This will truly challenge the power of the academic guild 
more fundamental ly than any incursion by the state in the past century. 
Yet the academic guild need fear little if it recognizes that autonomy 
is better secured via alliances with freely acting students than with an 
unbiddable regulating state." 
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